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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the associations between diversity of board members and financial 
performance of the firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Three demographic 
characteristics of board members—gender, nationality, and age—are used as the proxies for 
diversity. Using a sample of 169 listed firms, this study finds that both accounting and market 
performance have significant negative associations with gender diversity. Nationality 
diversity is found to have no influence on firm performance. In contrast, the proportion of 
young members is positively related to market performance, providing evidence that young 
people in the boardrooms are associated with improved financial performance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s business entities, employees and top management teams become increasingly 
diverse in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender, in addition to their diversity in terms of tenure, 
experience, educational background, and socioeconomic status (Jackson and Alvarez, 1992; 
Sessa and Jackson, 1995). It appears to be a common phenomenon that minority or “lower-
status” groups, such as women and minority ethnic groups, are likely to be marginalized in 
diverse groups (Ibarra, 1993), and therefore there are increasingly attempts to promote equal 
opportunity among different groups in the workplace. For example, such developed countries 
as the United States and Australia have established equal-opportunity commissions. 
Proposals on governance reform also increasingly state the importance of gender diversity on 
the board of directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Furthermore, the governments of Norway 
and Sweden have imposed gender quota on the boards of directors (Medland, 2004; Randøy 
et al., 2005). 
Board diversity has attracted the interest of researchers from various disciplines. Scholars 
have made attempts to link the diversity with different aspects within the firm, such as 
corporate strategic change (Goodstein et al., 1994; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), 
organizational innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), corporate governance (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), and corporate social responsibility (Coffey and Wang, 1998; Williams, 
2003). In addition to a considerable number of studies in the finance and corporate 
governance literature that examine the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance, such as Eisenberg et al., (1998), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), and Yermack 
(1996), there are also a growing number of studies investigating the relationship between 
board diversity and financial performance. Such studies have been conducted in the context 
of a few developed countries, such as the US (Carter et al., 2003; Krishnan and Park, 2005), 
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Canada (Francoeur et al., 2008), Spain (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008), the Netherlands 
(Marinova et al., 2010), and Scandinavian countries (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). On the 
other hand, such issues in the context of developing economies are still very rarely addressed. 
Among the few studies are Ararat et al. (2010) and Marimuthu (2008), which use the data of 
Turkey and Malaysia, respectively. 
The present study investigates the influence of board member diversity of the Indonesian 
listed firms on financial performance, which is measured by Tobin’s q, as the market-based 
performance measure, and return on assets (ROA), as the accounting-based performance 
measure. In this study, we use gender, nationality, and age as proxies for diversity. Using 169 
companies listed on the IDX, we use cross-sectional regression models to examine whether 
women, foreign nationals, and the young in the boardrooms influence financial performance. 
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature for the reason that it 
emphasizes on a developing economy that has different economic, legal, and cultural 
environments from those of Western economies, where most previous studies have been 
conducted. Our empirical evidence reveals that there is a significant negative relationship 
between gender diversity and financial performance. This result thus contradicts the findings 
of most prior studies conducted in the context of developed markets. It is also found that 
nationality diversity has no influence on financial performance. In contrast, consistent with 
prior findings, our results indicate that young people on the board are associated with 
improved financial performance. 
Indonesia is of interest since it has an emerging capital market that attracts a large 
number of foreign investments. At the end of 2009, foreign investors held 67.1 percent of the 
total value of shares traded on the IDX (Bapepam-LK, 2010). In addition, like China, 
Indonesia is one of the developing economies that adopt two-tier board structure, as discussed 
in Section 2.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper briefly 
discusses the regulation of two-tier board structure in Indonesia. In Section 3, we review prior 
studies and develop hypotheses. This is followed by Section 4, which describes the data and 
methodology used in this study. Section 5 presents and discusses empirical results, and 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Two-tier Board Structure in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia’s Corporation Law adopts two-tier board structure. This type of board 
structure is also adopted in such countries as Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan (Weimer 
and Pape, 1999). According to the Law, corporations shall have two boards in their 
organizational structures, namely Dewan Komisaris (“Board of Commissioners” or “BOC”) 
and Dewan Direksi (“Board of Management” or “BOM”). Members of BOC and BOM are 
elected by shareholders in the shareholders’ general meeting.  
BOM conducts the day-to-day management of the firm, and is headed by a president 
director. It is responsible to both shareholders and BOC. BOC, which is headed by a 
president commissioner, represents shareholders and conducts monitoring role on the 
management. Therefore, the function of BOC is merely non-executive. Its members may be 
affiliated to the firm (non-independent) or from outside the firm (independent). Each of BOC 
and BOM has its own members, so that overlapping membership is not permitted. Hence, in 
two-tier board structure there is no role duality between the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
the chairman, a debatable issue in unitary board structure. However, a president 
commissioner can be from either independent or non-independent members of BOC. 
Publicly-listed firms shall be in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, such as 
the Capital Market Law, Bapepam-LK regulations, and the IDX regulations. Current 
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applicable regulations require listed firms to have independent commissioners of at least 30 
percent of the total number of BOC members. In addition, they are also required to have at 
least one unaffiliated member of BOM. 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Diversity within the members of top management team may bring potential costs to the 
organization, such as interpersonal conflicts and communication problems (Cox, Jr., 1991). 
However, it is also believed that the diversity brings advantages to the entity, such as broader 
perspectives in decision making, higher creativity and innovation, and successful marketing 
to different types of customers (Cox, Jr., 1991; Cox and Blake, 1991; Robinson and Dechant, 
1997). 
In categorizing different types of diversity, one common method is to differentiate 
between observable and non-observable attributes. Observable or readily-detected attributes 
include demographic characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, and age; while non-
observable or underlying attributes include cognitive characteristics such as education, 
tenure, professional background, and personal values (Kilduff et al., 2000; Milliken and 
Martins, 1996). Observable attributes appear to be the focus of most research on diversity 
(Erhardt et al., 2003). Milliken and Martins (1996) suggest that unobservable attributes can 
create distinct differences on the orientations toward organizational issues and interaction 
styles, despite their unobservable nature.  
In studies on board diversity, researchers may use one or more attributes as proxies for 
diversity. Gender of the board members appears to be the most widely observed attribute. 
Other observable attributes that have been studied in the current literature include race or 
ethnic background (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Richard et al., 2004), age (Kilduff 
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et al., 2000; Siciliano, 1996), and nationality (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). Less frequently, 
researchers have also drawn particular diversity of non-observable attributes into their 
attention, such as tenure (Hambrick et al., 1996; Tihanyi et al., 2000), educational level 
(Herrmann and Datta, 2005; Smith et al., 1994), and occupational backgrounds (Goodstein et 
al., 1994). 
Since issues on the relationship between board diversity and financial performance in 
emerging markets are still very rarely addressed, this paper focuses on observable or readily-
detected attributes. In addition to the gender and age of board members, we address their 
nationality since we have no reliable options to identify their ethnic background, particularly 
in identifying whether they are from Chinese descent or pribumi (indigenous).[1]  
 
3.1. Gender diversity 
There are different arguments on the relationship between gender diversity and the firm’s 
competitive advantages. Some arguments support the proposition that greater diversity is 
likely to bring advantages to the firm due to various reasons. Women are considered to have 
“feeling” cognitive style that focuses on harmony (Hurst et al, 1989) and ability to facilitate 
dissemination of information (Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). They are also considered 
“tough” since they have to face various challenges prior to holding seats on the board, which 
reward them great prestige in the environment (Krishnan and Park, 2005). Furthermore, it is 
also argued that gender diversity would lead to increasing creativity and innovation 
(Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). On the other hand, other arguments suggest that greater 
gender diversity may bring disadvantages to the firm. Greater gender diversity may increase 
the likelihood of conflicts (Joshi et al., 2006; Richard et al., 2004), slow decision-making 
process (Hambrick et al., 1996), and differences in responding to risks (Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek, 1998). 
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Despite dramatic increase in number of women pursuing managerial careers (Omar and 
Davidson, 2001), women representation on the board of directors is generally low, including 
in developed economies. According to the census conducted by Australia’s Equal 
Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency—EOWA (2008), the percentage of female 
directors in Australia, the US, and the UK is estimated at 10.7, 15.4, and 12.2 percent, 
respectively. Scandinavian countries are leaders in terms of female representation in the 
boardroom, with the average percentage of 22.5 percent, as the result of gender quota policy 
(European Professional Women’s Network—EPWN, 2006).  
Gender diversity of the management team members receives concerns in a number of 
studies in the management and organization theory literature. For instance, researchers link 
the gender diversity with managerial advancement (Tharenou et al., 1994), management style 
(Rigg and Sparrow, 1994), occupational merit (Lobel and Clair, 1992), occupational 
pressures (Granleese, 2004), and personal networks (Ibarra, 1993). 
In the accounting and corporate governance literature, links between gender diversity and 
financial performance have also been addressed in a considerable number of studies. Using 
Tobin’s q as the measure of market-based performance, Carter et al. (2003) provide evidence 
that the US firms with higher proportion of women on the board of directors perform 
significantly better. Based on ROA as the measure of accounting-based performance 
measure, the positive association also exists (Shrader et al., 1997; Krishnan and Park, 2005). 
Using a sample of the Canadian firms, Francoeur et al. (2008) argue that high percentage of 
women officers lead to positive and significant abnormal returns. In Europe, the evidence of 
positive associations between gender diversity and financial performance comes from 
Denmark (Smith et al., 2005) and Spain (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). In the context 
of emerging markets, Ararat et al. (2010) provide evidence of such positive associations 
using a sample of the Turkish listed firms. 
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Interestingly, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Bøhren and Strøm (2007) indicate that the 
fraction of women in the boardrooms is negatively related to financial performance. Bär et al. 
(2008) indicate a negative relation between gender diversity of the management team and 
fund returns, using a sample from US mutual fund industry. Some researchers are unable to 
find a significant association between gender diversity and financial performance, such as 
Dwyer et al. (2003), Randøy et al. (2006), Rose (2007), and Marinova et al. (2010). Using a 
small sample consisting of 42 Indonesian manufacturing companies, Kusumastuti et al. 
(2007) find no empirical relationship between female directors and Tobin’s q.  
In the case of Indonesia, initial sample of the present study reveals that the average 
percentage of women on the boards of 383 listed firms on the IDX is 11.2 percent. This 
number is not very much different from that of Australia and the UK. Even though most 
studies for developed economies show that greater percentage of female directors lead to 
higher financial performance, such relationship may be different in Indonesia due to its 
unique circumstances. Because listed firms in Indonesia are mainly family controlled 
(Claessens et al., 2000), the presence of women on the board may be more driven by family 
relationships with the controlling shareholder instead of their occupational expertise and 
experiences. The lack of competence may in turn affect the corporate performance. Given 
this argument, the first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H1:  There is a negative relationship between gender diversity of the board members and 
financial performance. 
 
3.2. Nationality diversity 
Diversity of nationality and culture of the management team members may increase the 
likelihood of cross-cultural communication problem (Lehman and Dufrene, 2008) and 
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interpersonal conflicts (Cox, Jr., 1991). On the other hand, the presence of foreign nationals 
on the team are expected to bring competitive advantages to the firm, namely international 
networks, commitment to shareholder rights, and managerial entrenchment avoidance 
(Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). 
As the globalization of business increases, foreign investors have opportunities to buy 
larger stakes in the firm (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). In addition, cultural origins of the 
management team become increasingly diverse (Cox, Jr., 1991).  In emerging markets, which 
enjoy capital inflows from outside their countries, firms with larger foreign shareholdings 
may have heterogeneous nationality of their board or management team members. 
Unfortunately, the relationship between nationality diversity of the board members and firm 
financial performance in the emerging market case is still very rarely observed by 
researchers. 
Evidence of the association between citizenship heterogeneity and financial performance 
by far mostly comes from developed economies. The results of those studies show mixed 
results. Using a sample of Norwegian and Swedish firms, Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
indicate a significantly higher Tobin’s q for firms that have Anglo-American nationals in 
their boardrooms. Using net income as the performance measure, Ruigrok and Kaczmarek 
(2008) find that nationality diversity of the board and management team members is 
positively related to financial performance in the UK, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Choi 
et al. (2007) indicate the positive impacts of the presence of foreign directors on financial 
performance of the Korean firms. The similar result is also indicated by Choi and Hasan 
(2005) using a sample of the Korean banks. In the case of developing countries, Ararat et al. 
(2010) provide evidence that higher levels of nationality diversity on the boards of the 
Turkish firms lead to higher market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s q.  
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Other studies, however, find no empirical evidence of such associations. Using final 
market share and net marketing contribution of the European firms as the performance 
measure, Kilduff et al. (2000) fail to find any significant association. From Denmark, Rose 
(2007) also indicates that the proportion of foreign nationals has no any significant link with 
market performance based on Tobin’s q. 
In the Indonesian case, foreigners on the board in our sample account for averagely 8.9 
percent of the board seats. This relatively large proportion is partly due to high proportion of 
foreign ownership in some firms. Based on expected advantages of having foreign nationals 
in the boardrooms, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H2:  There is a positive relationship between nationality diversity of the board members 
and financial performance. 
 
3.3. Age diversity 
Age can be considered as a proxy for the extent of experience and risk-taking manner 
(Herrmann and Datta, 2005). Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that youthful managers are 
more inclined to undertake risky strategies, and firms with young managers will experience 
higher growth than their counterparts with older managers. This can be understood since 
older managers tend to be more risk averse (Barker and Mueller, 2002) and “may be at a 
point in their lives at which financial security and career security are important” (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984, p. 198), while younger managers tend to have higher ability to process new 
ideas, lower willingness to accept status quo, and less interest in career stability (Cheng et al., 
2010). In the management and organization theory literature, Hermann and Datta (2005) 
indicate that younger executives lead to higher levels of international diversification. Lower 
average age of the top management team is also positively related to the strategic change 
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(Wiersema and Bantel,1992). Furthermore, age diversity also has a positive relationship with 
the organization’s philanthropy (Siciliano, 1996). 
Indeed, some researchers provide evidence that older CEO or board chairman is 
positively associated with higher financial performance. For instance, Cheng et al. (2010) 
indicate that older chairmen in China have significant impacts on some performance 
measures, namely ROA, cumulative returns, and abnormal returns. Older executives tend to 
have richer experiences and practices, which accumulate into skill-based competencies (Reed 
and Defillippi, 1990). 
There are a limited number of studies that investigate the relationship between age 
diversity on the board or top management team and financial performance, and they report 
different results. Kilduff et al. (2000) indicate a positive association between age 
heterogeneity and marketing performance. Ararat et al. (2010), based on the data of Turkish 
firms, find that age diversity has a significant influence on return on equity (ROE), but not on 
Tobin’s q. On the other hand, Randøy et al. (2006) and Eklund et al. (2009) fail to find 
significant impacts of average age of board members on Tobin’s q in Nordic and Swedish 
markets, respectively. In addition, Kusumastuti et al. (2007) also provide no evidence of 
empirical link between financial performance and the proportion of directors whose age is 40 
years of age or older.  
For the purpose of this study, we investigate the effects of the proportion of young 
commissioners and directors on financial performance. Morck et al. (1989) define young 
leaders as president, chairman, and CEO no more than 60 years of age at a particular point of 
time. For the Indonesian case, due to differences in life expectancy (see United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2007) and retirement age, we define young 
commissioners and directors as those no more than 50 years of age as at 31 December 2007. 
Surprisingly, our sample of Indonesian listed firms shows that the average proportion of 
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young members (no more than 50 years of age) on the board is 47 percent. This seems to 
suggest that the presence of young people in the boardrooms is partly due to the nature of 
Indonesian listed firms that are mainly family controlled (Claessens et al., 2000). Based on 
prior findings that young managers are likely to be less conservative and more motivated to 
process new ideas, we argue that higher proportion of youth on the board is positively related 
to financial performance. Our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3:  There is a positive relationship between age diversity of the board members and 
financial performance. 
 
In measuring the diversity of the board or management team members, there are at least 
four different approaches employed by researchers. First, some use the average or variation 
coefficient of particular attributes such as age and tenure (Eklund et al., 2009; Herrmann and 
Datta, 2005; Tihanyi et al., 2000). Second, others use heterogeneity index, with Blau index 
being the most commonly used (Ararat et al., 2010; Richard et al., 2004; Smith et al., 1994). 
Third, a number of researchers involve dichotomous variables to indicate whether particular 
attributes are present on the board or management team (Choi et al., 2007; Krishnan and 
Parsons, 2008). Fourth, most studies in our literature review indicate the diversity by 
computing the proportion of members with particular demographic attributes, such as Carter 
et al. (2003), Erhardt et al. (2003), Krishnan and Park (2005), and Oxelheim and Randøy 
(2003). For the purpose of this study, we use the proportion of women, foreign nationals, and 
the young in the boardrooms to indicate the diversity of gender, nationality, and age, 
respectively. We also employ dichotomous variables and Blau heterogeneity index in our 
further analysis. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1. Methodology 
In this study, we conduct cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate the extent to 
which board diversity affects financial performance. Taking into account explanatory and 
control variables that may affect financial performance, we specify our model as follows:  
 
PERF = β0 + β1 PWOMEN + β2 PFOREIGN + β3 PYOUNG + β4 LNASSET 
+ β5 LNBSIZE + β6 LARGEST + β7 BLOCK + ε 
 
where PERF is financial performance, which is measured by ROA and natural logarithm of 
Tobin’s q; PWOMEN is the proportion of women; PFOREIGN is the proportion of foreign 
nationals; PYOUNG is the proportion of members less than 50 years of age; LNASSET is 
natural logarithm of total assets as the proxy for firm size; LNBSIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of board members; LARGEST is the proportion of ordinary shares owned 
by the largest shareholder; and BLOCK is the proportion of ordinary shares owned by 
blockholders.  
Using dichotomous variable and Blau index to indicate the presence of particular 
attributes and heterogeneity index, respectively, the following models are also used in our 
analysis: 
PERF = β0 + β1 DWOMEN + β2 DFOREIGN + β3 DYOUNG + β4 LNASSET 
+ β5 LNBSIZE + β6 LARGEST + β7 BLOCK + ε 
 
PERF = β0 + β1 BLAUGENDER + β2 BLAUNATIONAL + β3 BLAUAGE  
+ β4 LNASSET + β5 LNBSIZE + β6 LARGEST + β7 BLOCK + ε 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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where DWOMEN, DFOREIGN, and DYOUNG are dichotomous variables that equal 1 if the 
firm has at least one woman, one foreign national, and one member no more than 50 years of 
age, respectively, on the board; while BLAUGENDER, BLAUNATIONAL, and BLAUAGE 
are Blau heterogeneity indices for gender, nationality, and age, respectively, in the 
boardrooms. 
 
4.2. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is the firm’s financial performance. Two measurements are used 
in this study, namely ROA as the proxy for accounting-based performance measure and 
Tobin’s q as the proxy for market-based performance measure. These two measurements of 
financial performance are also used in such prior studies as Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
Adams et al. (2009), and Adams and Ferreira (2009). 
ROA is obtained from the Indonesian Capital Market Directory 2008, which defines it to 
be the ratio of the firm’s net income to its book value of assets. This definition is consistent 
with Shrader et al. (1997) and Erhardt et al. (2003). Tobin’s q is computed using formula 
suggested by Adams et al. (2009). They define Tobin’s q to be the ratio of the firm’s market 
value to its book value of assets; market value is calculated as the book value of assets minus 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. As conducted by Adams et al. 
(2009) and suggested by Hirsch (1993), Tobin’s q is included in the model using its natural 
logarithmic form. 
 
4.3. Explanatory Variables 
This study uses three key explanatory variables to test hypotheses, namely the 
proportions of women, foreign nations, and youth on the board. The proportion of women is 
defined as the ratio of the number of women on the board to the total number of board 
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members. Similar definitions also apply for the proportions of foreign nationals and youth. 
We run regressions referring to combined numbers of BOC and BOM members. In addition, 
we also address two-tier board structure adopted by the Indonesian law by running 
regressions separately for BOC and BOM. 
Explanatory variables in our further analysis also consist of dichotomous variables to 
indicate the presence of women, foreign nationals, and youth on the board. These 
dichotomous variables enable us to evaluate whether the presence of women, foreigners, and 
youth leads to significant effects on financial performance. Furthermore, using Blau index, 
we also include heterogeneity levels of gender, nationality, and age in separate regressions. 
 
4.4. Control Variables 
We have four control variables to be included in our models, namely firm size, board 
size, largest shareholder ownership, and blockholder ownership. In terms of the association 
between firm size and financial performance, empirical evidence of prior studies is mixed. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Krishnan and Park (2005) indicate that firm size is positively 
related to Tobin’s q and ROA, while Carter et al. (2003) fail to do so. Interestingly, using 
Malaysian data, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find that firm size is positively related to ROA 
but is negatively related to Tobin’s q. We predict that firm size has a positive relationship 
with financial performance. 
Board size is expected to have a significant relationship with financial performance. 
Yermack (1996) suggest that smaller board size leads to higher financial performance. This 
finding is supported by later studies, such as Carter et al. (2003) and Eklund et al. (2009). 
Evidence from Malaysia and Singapore also indicate the same result (Mak and Kusnadi, 
2004). In contrast, evidence from Australia suggests that board size is positively related to 
firm performance (Setia-Atmaja, 2008). As suggested by Coles et al. (2008), in complex 
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firms that have greater advising requirements, board size is positively related to Tobin’s q. As 
such, board size is expected to have a positive influence on financial performance. 
The third and fourth control variables are largest shareholder ownership and blockholder 
ownership, respectively. Blockholders are shareholders who own substantial portion of the 
firm’s shares, which is generally defined as 5 percent of the firm’s ordinary shares. Previous 
empirical evidence on the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance 
shows contradicting results. A number of studies provide evidence that there is a significant 
positive association between shareholdings of large investors and corporate performance, 
such as Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Joh (2003), using a sample of Malaysian and Korean 
firms, respectively. Other scholars fail to find any significant association between the two 
variables, such as Krivogorsky (2006) and Weir et al. (2002). We predict that a positive 
association exists between concentrated ownership and financial performance of the 
Indonesian listed firms. 
 
4.5.  Sample Data 
The financial year 2007 is chosen as the period under study.[2] Our initial sample consists 
of 383 firms, the total number of public firms listed on the IDX as at 31 December 2007. We 
exclude firms with negative equity and incomplete data. The final sample of the present study 
consists of 169 firms, or 44.13 percent of the total number of listed firms. Financial data 
required for this study (total assets and ROA) are obtained from the Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory 2008. In addition to total assets, data of shareholders’ equity and market 
capitalization are also obtained from the same source to compute Tobin’s q.  
We obtain directorship and ownership data (board size, largest shareholder ownership, 
blockholder ownership, and demographic characteristics of each board member—gender, 
nationality, and age) mainly from annual reports available on the Internet, particularly from 
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the IDX’s or the firm’s websites. However, since required demographic data are not always 
available in the annual reports, we make our best attempts to obtain the data from other 
reliable sources that are accessible via the Internet, such as the firm’s legal documents (e.g. 
documents of shareholders general meeting) and the websites of Financial Times and 
Reuters. 
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of selected 
variables in our final sample. The average figures of ROA and Tobin’s q are 3.68 percent and 
2.08, respectively. The average proportions of women, foreign nationals, and young members 
in the boardrooms are 12, 9, and 47 percent, respectively. Interestingly, the fraction of the 
young holding seats on BOM is 61 percent on average. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
5.1.  Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 presents pairwise correlation matrix for variables considered in Equation (1). 
BOC and BOM are combined for simplicity. LNASSET is positively correlated to ROA, 
providing evidence that larger firms tend to show better accounting performance. 
Surprisingly, there is a significant negative relation between PWOMEN and LNTOBINQ, 
which is further discussed in multivariate analysis section. LNBSIZE has a positive 
relationship with PFOREIGN, indicating that larger board size lead to greater nationality 
diversity. LNBSIZE also shows positive associations with LNASSET and LNTOBINQ, 
suggesting that larger board size is more likely to belong to firms with larger assets and 
higher market performance. Finally, PYOUNG is negatively correlated with both LNASSET 
18 
 
and LNBSIZE, implying that larger firms with greater number of board members are likely to 
have lower proportion of young people in their boardrooms.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.2.  Multivariate Analysis 
Using several models derived from Equation (1), we conduct cross-sectional regression 
analysis, whose results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Before running the regression analysis, 
the data are tested first to make sure that they do not suffer from multicollinearity and 
heteroskedasticity. From correlation matrix presented in Table 2, the correlation coefficients 
between independent variables are ranging from –0.28 to 0.67. Gujarati (2003) suggests that 
multicollinearity problem may exist when the correlation exceeds 0.80. In addition, we also 
consider VIF (variance inflation factor) for each independent variable. VIF values greater 
than 10 indicate multicollinearity problems (Gujarati, 2003). None of the VIF values in our 
models exceed 3; hence multicollinearity is not a problem in our models. To deal with 
potential heteroskedasticity problem, as suggested by Brooks (2008), we use White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimates. 
Table 3 reports the results of the regressions linking board diversity and accounting 
performance based on ROA. Only the proportion of young members on BOC is found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with ROA. This seems to suggest that young members 
on BOC are unlikely to improve accounting performance, since BOC conducts monitoring 
and advising roles instead of executive function. Contrary to our expectations, we find that 
none of the proportions of women and foreign nationals from the three models have 
significant impacts on ROA, thus allowing us to reject Hypotheses 1 and 2 when accounting 
performance based on ROA acts as the dependent variable. The insignificant results of our 
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evidence support prior findings that accounting performance is not significantly associated 
with gender, nationality, and age diversity (Randøy et al., 2006; Richard et al., 2004).  
There are at least three possible interpretations of our results. As suggested by Tacheva 
and Huse (2004), board composition does not matter much to the firm’s performance. They 
suggest that the firm performance is more affected by task performance of the individuals on 
the board. Additionally, actual effects of board diversity may be difficult to determine since 
the firm performance is also affected by many other factors (Randøy et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, since listed firms in Indonesia are mainly family controlled (Claessens et al., 
2000), the positions held in the boardrooms may partly be based on family relationships 
rather than occupational expertise and experiences, hence making the board composition does 
not matter to improve firm performance. 
The impact of the firm’s assets on its accounting performance is found to be significantly 
positive. Similar to the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Krishnan and Park (2005), 
this implies that larger firms tend to have significantly higher ROA than their smaller 
counterparts. Despite its significant and positive correlation with firm size, board size is 
found not to be significantly related to firm performance, a result similar to Oxelheim and 
Randøy (2003). Interestingly, concentrated ownership variables are found to be significantly 
associated with accounting performance with different signs. While the proportion of shares 
held by the largest shareholder has a positive impact on ROA, blockholder ownership is 
found to negatively influence the accounting performance measure.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions investigating the effects of board diversity 
on market performance based on Tobin’s q. Our empirical evidence reveals that the 
proportion of women on the board has a significant negative relation with market 
performance based on Tobin’s q, thus allowing us to accept Hypothesis 1. Providing similar 
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evidence to Adams and Ferreira (2009), our result contradicts other studies that report 
positive impact or no impact of gender diversity on Tobin’s q. It would seem that higher 
proportion of women on the board is associated with lower level of market performance. 
Another possible explanation is that higher proportion of women could lead to 
overmonitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). It should be emphasized that the explanatory 
power (R2) of the three models of Table 4 are no more than 12 percent, which suggests that 
market performance is also explained by many factors other than board diversity and the 
control variables. 
The regression results also suggest that the proportion of foreign nationals in the 
boardrooms has no significant association with market performance. Hence, this finding is 
consistent with Randøy et al. (2006) and Rose (2007). A possible reason is that firms with 
higher proportion of foreign nationals in their boardrooms are not perceived by the market as 
more attractive than their counterparts that have no or lower proportion of foreign nationals. 
The evidence in Models (2) and (3) of Table 4 suggests that the proportion of board members 
no more than 50 years of age has a significantly positive influence on Tobin’s q. This seems 
to suggest that younger board members are more likely to be motivated to face new 
challenges and strategic changes that lead to higher performance, as suggested by Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992).  
In terms of control variables, firm size (as proxied by total assets) is found to be 
negatively related to Tobin’s q. Hence, this finding contradicts findings of studies in the 
context of the US firms, which suggest that larger firm size leads to higher market 
performance, as indicated by Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Carter et al., (2003). However, 
the negative association between firm size and Tobin’s q is consistent with findings of studies 
based on the data of Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), Turkey (Ararat et al., 2010) and 
Spain (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). This seems to suggest that smaller firms are 
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perceived by the market as better performers than their larger counterparts (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989).  
Further, our evidence reveals that board size is positively related to Tobin’s q in all 
models of Table 4. Hence, this result contradicts the findings of Yermack (1996), Eisenberg 
et al. (1998), and Mak and Kusnadi (2005). It seems that greater number of board members 
would be able to provide more advice to the CEO on business strategy, particularly in large 
and complex firms (Coles et al., 2008; Setia-Atmaja, 2008). Finally, concentrated ownership 
has no significant impacts on Tobin’s q in all of our three models. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
To investigate whether the presence of women, foreign nationals, and young members on 
the board has a significant link with financial performance, we employ dichotomous variables 
to indicate the presence. Furthermore, we also use Blau heterogeneity index since some 
authors argue that the proportion of board members with particular attributes is not an 
appropriate measure of diversity (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). This index is 
introduced by Blau (1977) and is computed as follows: 
 
Blau index = 1 –  
 
where Pi2 is the percentage of board members in each category and n is the total number of 
categories used. Table 5 presents summary statistics for the dichotomous variables and Blau 
heterogeneity index. For the sake of simplicity, BOC and BOM are combined. It can be seen 
that 54 percent of firms included in the sample have at least one woman in their boardrooms. 
While 98 percent of firms have at least one young member holding the board seats, only 33 
percent have foreign nationals in their boardrooms. Blau heterogeneity indices show the same 
results. Nationality and age diversity appear to have the lowest and the highest index, 
(4) 
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respectively, on average. Blau index shows the highest score at 0.50 when the proportions of 
members from both groups (e.g. the fraction of men and the fraction of women on the board) 
are equal. On the other hand, the index shows the lowest score at zero when all of board 
members are from one group (e.g. all members are men or women). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The results of the regressions using dichotomous variables are reported in Table 6. For 
the sake of simplicity, the regressions are not conducted separately for BOC and BOM. The 
results indicate that despite insignificant relationship between the proportion of women and 
ROA (as reported in Table 4), the presence of women on the board is found to be negatively 
related to ROA. Similar to our previous interpretation, low-performing firms are more likely 
to have female members on their boards. Employing Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, as 
presented in Model (2) of Table 5, the results are identical with those of Table 4. The 
presence of women is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s q, while a positive association 
exists between Tobin’s q and the presence of young members on the board. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Using Blau index as the measure of diversity, the results are slightly different. Similar to 
the regressions using the proportion, none of the three types of diversity appear to have 
significant effects on both measures of performance. This suggests that the diversity of 
gender, nationality, and age of the board members of the Indonesian listed firms does not 
matter to accounting performance. Again, gender diversity is negatively associated with 
Tobin’s q, which may suggest that gender diversity on the board is more likely to belong to 
low-performing firms. Interestingly, while the proportion of the young on the board has a 
significant influence on Tobin’s q, age diversity is found to have no significant impact. This 
can be understood since the computation of Blau index is different from the proportion 
computation. Blau index considers all groups and does not pay attention to only one group. 
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Hence, when the proportion of female members on the board of a firm is 100 percent, the 
index would be zero since the firm has no male members. In other words, the gender of its 
board members is totally homogeneous.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
We further conduct sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our results. As the 
alternatives to ROA and Tobin’s q, net profit margin (NPM) is used as the measure of 
accounting performance, whereas price-to-book ratio (PBV) is used as the measure of market 
performance. We repeat regressions in Tables 3, 4, and 6 and use log value of sales revenues, 
instead of log value of total assets, as the proxy for firm size. Our findings remain the same as 
those reported. 
In another sensitivity test, we repeat regressions in Table 7 using Shannon index of 
diversity. Shannon index, or Shannon-Weaver index, is introduced by Shannon and Weaver 
(1949) and is computed as follows: 
 
Shannon index =   –  
 
where Pi is the percentage of board members in each category and n is the total number of 
categories used. Our results remain unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the relationship between the diversity of gender, nationality, and 
age of the board members and firm financial performance in Indonesia. A number of such 
(5) 
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studies have been undertaken in the context of a few developed economies. Hence, this study 
makes contribution to the literature by addressing the issue in a developing economy that has 
different economic, legal, and cultural environments. Indonesia is a civil law country whose 
capital market is characterized by large family ownership of its listed firms and significant 
value of foreign trading on the stock exchange. 
Three demographic characteristics of the board members—gender, nationality, and 
age—are addressed in this study. We employ the proportion of women, foreign nationals, and 
board members no more than 50 years of age as the key explanatory variables. Furthermore, 
we also employ dichotomous variables to indicate the presence of those groups on the board, 
as well as Blau heterogeneity index to score the level of diversity in the boardrooms. Firm 
size, board size, and the proportion of independent commissioners are also included in the 
model as control variables. We conduct cross-sectional regression analysis using a sample 
comprising 169 firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange as at 31 December 2007. 
We find that the proportion of the young in the boardrooms of the Indonesian listed firms 
is relatively high and has a significant positive association with market performance, even 
though Blau index of age diversity has no significant influence on Tobin’s q. This seems to 
imply that younger board members are more likely to be motivated to face new challenges 
and strategic changes that lead to higher performance, as suggested by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) and Wiersema and Bantel (1992). In contrast, foreign nationals holding board seats 
have no influence on either accounting or market performance, which seem to suggest that 
nationality diversity does not matter to financial performance. 
Using ROA as the measure of accounting performance, we find that none of the 
proportions of women, foreign nationals, and the young have significant influence on firm 
performance, except the proportion of the young on BOC. The similar result is also found 
when using Blau index for diversity. However, the presence of women in the boardrooms is 
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found to have a significant negative relationship with ROA. When the analysis employs 
market-based performance based on Tobin’s q, the proportion and the presence of women 
also show significant negative impacts. The interpretations on this finding need to be 
undertaken in caution. This would seem that higher proportion of female members is 
associated with lower level of firm performance. It should not immediately be interpreted that 
the presence of women in the boardrooms would destroy shareholder value. Hence, this study 
also suggests a call for the encouragement of equal opportunity for all groups of employees, 
including women, based on their competence and contribution to the organization. 
The present study is subject to some limitations, which are expected to be overcome by 
future studies. First, this study uses ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to examine the 
effects of board diversity on financial performance. Hence, future studies need to address the 
effects of firm performance and other firm characteristics on the board diversity through a 
simultaneous equation framework, as conducted by Carter et al. (2003) and Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2008). Second, this study employs cross-sectional analysis among listed firms 
in one financial period only, which makes our results cannot be generalized for other 
financial periods. Future studies need to consider the use of longitudinal data to provide more 
reliable insights into the relationship between board diversity and financial performance.  
 
Notes 
 
[1]  Carter et al. (2003) identify the ethnic background of board members of Fortune 500 
companies (whether they are White, Afro-American, Asian, or Hispanic) based on 
Directorship database. On the other hand, in the context of Malaysia, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) identify the ethnic background of board members, whether they are bumiputera 
(indigenous) or non-bumiputera, based on the company registrars and annual reports. 
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This seems to be possible to undertake due to unique naming practices among different 
ethnic groups in Malaysia (see Daniels, 2005). For the Indonesian case, relying on annual 
reports to gather information, we have no reliable options to identify the race or ethnic 
background of the board members due to the following reasons. First, ethnic-Chinese 
Indonesian, playing an important role in the country’s economy, mostly have 
“Indonesian names” as the result of name-changing policy imposed by the Suharto 
government (Suryadinata, 2008). Second, some companies do not provide the pictures of 
their board members, while some others have poor scanning quality of their annual 
reports. Third, even though good pictures of board members are available in the annual 
reports, it may not be always reliable to identify someone’s race based on the physical 
appearance on the pictures. It would seem that we could not always correctly guess 
whether a fair-skinned man with a “typical Indonesian name” on a picture is Chinese or 
pribumi (indigenous). 
 
[2]  The financial year 2007 is considered the most recent “normal period,” due to global 
financial crisis that heavily affected the Indonesian capital market in 2008 and 2009. 
While a number of studies on the relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance use longitudinal data (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera, 2007; Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003; Rose, 2007), other studies use purely 
cross-sectional data (e.g. Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Krishnan and Park, 
2005; Shrader et al., 1997; Randøy et al., 2006). As Carter et al. (2003), we recognize the 
limitations of using a single year of data. Hence, our results cannot claim to represent 
other financial periods. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the firms captured in our sample. ROA is 
accounting performance, measured by return on assets. TOBINQ is market performance; 
measured by Tobin’s q. ASSET is the book value of total assets. BSIZE is board size, 
measured as the total number of board members. PWOMEN is the proportion of women. 
PFOREIGN is the proportion of foreign nationals. PYOUNG is the proportion of board 
members no more than 50 years of age. LARGEST is the proportion of common shares 
owned by the largest shareholder. BLOCK is the proportion of common shares owned by 
blockholders (shareholders with 5 percent of ownership or more). 
 
Variables Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ROA (percent) 169 3.68 7.12 –21.50 34.40 
TOBINQ 169 2.08 5.08 0.24 64.40 
ASSET (billion Rupiah) 169 5,197 17,938 10 203,735 
BSIZE 169 8.44 3.27 4.00 19.00 
LARGEST 169 0.47 0.21 0.06 0.96 
BLOCK 169 0.69 0.19 0.06 1.00 
Boards of Commissioners and Management     
PWOMEN 169 0.12 0.15 0.00 1.00 
PFOREIGN 169 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.75 
PYOUNG 169 0.47 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Board of Commissioners      
PWOMEN 169 0.11 0.18 0.00 1.00 
PFOREIGN 169 0.09 0.19 0.00 1.00 
PYOUNG 169 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Board of Management      
PWOMEN 169 0.13 0.19 0.00 1.00 
PFOREIGN 169 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.83 
PYOUNG 169 0.61 0.28 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2 
Correlation coefficient matrix 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients between variables included in regression models. 
ROA is return on assets. LNTOBINQ is log value of Tobin’s q. PWOMEN is the proportion 
of women. PFOREIGN is the proportion of foreign nationals. PYOUNG is the proportion of 
board members no more than 50 years of age. LNASSET is log value of total assets. 
LNBSIZE is log value of the total number of board members. LARGEST is the proportion of 
common shares owned by the largest shareholder. BLOCK is the proportion of common 
shares owned by blockholders (shareholders with 5 percent of ownership or more). For 
simplicity, board of commissioner (BOC) and board of management (BOM) are combined. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  
 ROA LNTOBINQ PWOMEN PFOREIGN PYOUNG LNASSET LNBSIZE LARGEST BLOCK 
ROA   1.00         
LNTOBINQ   0.04   1.00        
PWOMEN –0.07 –0.16**   1.00       
PFOREIGN   0.07   0.08 –0.15**   1.00      
PYOUNG –0.09   0.06   0.20*** –0.08   1.00     
LNASSET   0.19** –0.07 –0.08   0.11 –0.23***   1.00    
LNBSIZE   0.07   0.14* –0.09   0.34*** –0.28***   0.67***   1.00   
LARGEST   0.04   0.06   0.05   0.22***   0.06   0.01   0.03   1.00  
BLOCK –0.15*   0.05   0.01   0.03   0.14* –0.13*   0.02   0.55***   1.00 
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Table 3 
OLS regression of ROA on board diversity 
 
The dependent variable is return on assets. PWOMEN is the proportion of women. 
PFOREIGN is the proportion of foreign nationals. PYOUNG is the proportion of members no 
more than 50 years of age. LNASSET is log value of total assets. LNBSIZE is log value of 
the total number of board members. LARGEST is the proportion of common shares owned 
by the largest shareholder. BLOCK is the proportion of common shares owned by 
blockholders (shareholders with 5 percent of ownership or more).  BOC is board of 
commissioners. BOM is board of management. Robust t-statistics, based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Independent variables Predicted  
sign 
BOC BOM BOC and BOM 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  7.228* 4.191 6.906 
  (1.455) (0.855) (1.280) 
PWOMEN (–) –1.760 –1.674 –2.491 
  (–0.880) (–0.778) (–0.863) 
PFOREIGN (+) 1.430 3.113 2.864 
  (0.343) (0.803) (0.617) 
PYOUNG (+) –3.584** 1.166 –1.923 
  (–1.757) (0.576) (–0.830) 
LNASSET (+) 0.735** 0.816** 0.790** 
  (1.837) (1.994) (1.950) 
LNBSIZE (+) –2.024 –1.781 –2.180 
  (–1.164) (–1.028) (–1.202) 
LARGEST (+) 5.850** 4.716* 5.122* 
  (1.732) (1.458) (1.542) 
BLOCK (+) –8.523** –7.758** –8.034** 
  (–2.021) (–1.922) (–1.965) 
Number of observations  169 169 169 
R2  0.092 0.079 0.082 
F-statistic  2.337** 1.960* 2.057** 
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Table 4 
OLS regression of Tobin’s q on board diversity 
 
The dependent variable is log value of Tobin’s q. PWOMEN is the proportion of women. 
PFOREIGN is the proportion of foreign nationals. PYOUNG is the proportion of members no 
more than 50 years of age. LNASSET is log value of total assets. LNBSIZE is log value of 
the total number of board members. LARGEST is the proportion of common shares owned 
by the largest shareholder. BLOCK is the proportion of common shares owned by 
blockholders (shareholders with 5 percent of ownership or more).  BOC is board of 
commissioners. BOM is board of management. Robust t-statistics, based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Independent variables Predicted  
sign 
BOC BOM BOC and BOM 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  –0.178 –0.418 –0.341 
  (–0.438) (–1.230) (–0.897) 
PWOMEN (–) –0.626*** –0.418** –0.766*** 
  (–2.883) (–1.839) (–2.515) 
PFOREIGN (+) –0.111 0.008 –0.138 
  (–0.435) (0.032) (–0.497) 
PYOUNG (+) 0.142 0.356** 0.347** 
  (0.782) (2.171) (2.109) 
LNASSET (+) –0.098** –0.101** –0.101** 
  (–2.132) (–2.296) (–2.240) 
LNBSIZE (+) 0.585*** 0.627*** 0.633*** 
  (3.136) (3.254) (3.272) 
LARGEST (+) 0.244 0.210 0.231 
  (0.922) (0.821) (0.935) 
BLOCK (+) –0.101 –0.110 –0.105 
  (–0.317) (–0.350) (–0.332) 
Number of observations  169 169 169 
R2  0.101 0.102 0.107 
F-statistic  2.583** 2.605** 2.763*** 
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Table 5 
Summary statistics for dichotomous variables and Blau index of diversity 
 
This table reports the summary of dichotomous variables and Blau index of diversity used in 
regression models. Board of commissioners (BOC) and board of management (BOM) are 
combined. DWOMEN is a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if the firm has at least one 
woman on the board and 0 otherwise. DFOREIGN is a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 
if the firm has at least one foreign national on the board and 0 otherwise. DYOUNG is a 
dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if the firm has at least one member no more than 50 
years of age on the board and 0 otherwise. BLAUGENDER is Blau index for gender diversity 
of the board members. BLAUNATIONAL is Blau index for nationality diversity of the board 
members. BLAUAGE is Blau index for age diversity of the board members. 
 
Variables Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Boards of Commissioners and Management     
Dichotomous variables      
DWOMEN 169 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
DFOREIGN 169 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
DYOUNG 169 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Blau index of diversity      
BLAUGENDER 169 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.50 
BLAUNATIONAL 169 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.50 
BLAUAGE 169 0.39 0.14 0.00 0.50 
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Table 6 
OLS regression of ROA and Tobin’s q on board diversity using dichotomous variables 
 
The dependent variable in Model (1) is ROA. The dependent variable in Model (2) is log 
value of Tobin’s q. DWOMEN is a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if the firm has at 
least one woman on the board and 0 otherwise. DFOREIGN is a dichotomous variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm has at least one foreign national on the board and 0 otherwise. DYOUNG 
is a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if the firm has at least one member no more than 
50 years of age on their board and 0 otherwise. LNASSET is log value of total assets. 
LNBSIZE is log value of the total number of board members. LARGEST is the proportion of 
common shares owned by the largest shareholder. BLOCK is the proportion of common 
shares owned by blockholders (shareholders with 5 percent of ownership or more).  In both 
models, board of commissioners (BOC) and board of management (BOM) are combined for 
the sake of simplicity. Robust t-statistics, based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Independent variables Predicted    
sign 
ROA Log (Tobin’s q) 
(1) (2) 
Intercept  6.535* –0.754** 
  (1.357) (–1.781) 
DWOMEN (–) –2.916*** –0.245*** 
  (–2.691) (–2.465) 
DFOREIGN (+) 0.838 0.000 
  (0.657) (0.001) 
DYOUNG (+) –2.850 0.625** 
  (–0.812) (2.026) 
LNASSET (+) 0.834** –0.111*** 
  (2.081) (–3.144) 
LNBSIZE (+) –1.059 0.651*** 
  (–0.482) (3.366) 
LARGEST (+) 5.212** 0.175 
  (1.677) (0.640) 
BLOCK (+) –6.778** –0.000 
  (–1.925) (–0.097) 
Number of observations  169 169 
R2  0.117 0.127 
F-statistic  3.042*** 3.355*** 
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Table 7 
OLS regression of ROA and Tobin’s q on board diversity using Blau index 
 
The dependent variable in Model (1) is ROA. The dependent variable in Model (2) is log 
value of Tobin’s q. BLAUGENDER is a Blau index for gender diversity of board members. 
BLAUNATIONAL is a Blau index for nationality diversity of board members. BLAUAGE is 
Blau index for age diversity of board members. LNASSET is log value of total assets. 
LNBSIZE is log value of the total number of board members. LARGEST is the proportion of 
common shares owned by the largest shareholder. BLOCK is the proportion of common 
shares owned by blockholders (shareholders with 5 percent of ownership or more).  In both 
models, board of commissioners (BOC) and board of management (BOM) are combined for 
the sake of simplicity. Robust t-statistics, based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Independent variables Predicted    
sign 
ROA Log (Tobin’s q) 
(1) (2) 
Intercept  5.136* –0.156 
  (1.341) (–0.468) 
BLAUGENDER (–) –4.419* –0.732*** 
  (–1.357) (–2.580) 
BLAUNATIONAL (+) 1.718 –0.117 
  (0.458) (–0.360) 
BLAUAGE (+) –1.601 0.400 
  (–0.385) (1.105) 
LNASSET (+) 0.783** –0.107*** 
  (1.940) (–3.040) 
LNBSIZE (+) –1.363 0.584*** 
  (–0.610) (3.003) 
LARGEST (+) 5.130* 0.197 
  (1.614) (0.712) 
BLOCK (+) –7.537** –0.001 
  (–2.125) (–0.323) 
Number of observations  169 169 
R2  0.084 0.113 
F-statistic  2.108** 2.925*** 
 
